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Several authors recognize that consumers have social sentiments and therefore derive utility 
from contributing resources to the provision of public goods. However, there is little discussion 
in the literature on how these sentiments develop. This paper models how social sentiments 
develop in communities and how they affect private provision. We propose that increases in 
the provision of public goods lead to increases in consumers’ social sentiments. Given the 
assumptions of the model a community would converge to an equilibrium level of social 
sentiments with higher private provision that predicted by traditional theory. Although 
government provision partially crowds out private provision in the short-run it can increase, or 
crowds in, private provision in the long run by moving the community to a new equilibrium 
with higher social sentiments. When consumers have heterogeneous preferences, the 
government can increase private provision and move the community to an equilibrium with 
higher social sentiments by redistributing income between consumers.  
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1.    Introduction 
    
The pure theory of public expenditure, first proposed by Samuelson (1954), suggests that 
private markets under-provide public goods. Andreoni (1988) shows that given the 
assumptions of the pure theory of public expenditure only the wealthiest consumers would 
contribute to the provision of public goods and that private provision will be driven to zero in 
a large economy. Warr (1982) and Roberts (1984) find that, as long as private provision is 
positive, each dollar that the government spends on the provision of public goods would 
reduce private provision by exactly a dollar. Warr (1983) also demonstrates that in Nash 
equilibrium private provision is independent of income distribution. Therefore, government 
policy cannot affect the total provision of public goods unless the government completely 
crowds out private provision. 
Authors have challenged the pure theory of public expenditure on several grounds. US 
data collected on private contributions and summarized by Andreoni (1988) reveals that even 
members of the poorest quintile contribute to charities. Empirical studies by Abraham and 
Schmitz (1978, 1984) also show that crowding out is quite small. Additionally, Hochman and 
Rodgers (1973) find that, despite Warr’s prediction, contributions to charities are highly 
dependent on income distribution.  
Experiments on voluntary contributions mechanism provide additional evidence against 
the pure theory of public expenditure. Participants in these experiments typically contribute a 
significant amount of their resources to the group exchange even when theory predicts that 
they would contribute nothing (Marwell and Ames 1981; Schneider and Pommerhene 1981; 
Isaac, Walker and Thomas 1984; Isaac, McCue and Plott 1985; and others). Andreoni (1995) 
estimates that roughly half of the contributions to the group exchange in public goods 
experiments are made out of a desire to cooperate (the rest are made in error). In another 
experiment Andreoni (1993) finds that the imposition of a lump-sum tax that is used to 
finance investment in the group exchange hardly reduces participants’ contributions.  
There has been extensive discussion in the literature on why consumers contribute more 
than predicted by traditional theory and why government provision does not completely 
crowd out private provision. Andreoni (1989, 1990) asserts that consumers derive a feeling of 
warm-glow from contributing. Steinberg (1987) and Harbaugh (1998) argue that enjoyment 
from contributing results from secondary benefits that consumers receive from contributing   3
such as prestige, status and awards of recognition. Becker (1974) claims that consumers 
contribute to gain social approval and avoid social sanctions. 
There may be other reasons why consumers contribute more resources than predicted by 
traditional theory. Van Dijk and Van Winden (1997) theorize that consumers have social ties 
with other consumers in their community and they therefore weight the utility of other 
consumers. Rabin (1993), Van Dijk and Wilke (1994) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assert 
that consumers have an aversion to inequitable outcomes. Consequently, wealthier consumers 
may contribute resources to the provision of public goods in order to restore some degree of 
equality between themselves and poorer consumers.  
Most of these explanations are founded on the idea that consumers have sentiments to 
cooperate with other consumers in their community, which we term social sentiments. A 
consumer’s social sentiment can be thought of as an index that measures the consumer’s 
affinity towards her community and its members. The higher the consumer’s social sentiment 
the more utility she derives from contributing. 
Although many authors recognize the existence of social sentiments, there is little 
discussion in the literature on how social sentiments form or how they evolve. In this paper 
we discuss how social sentiments evolve. We also discuss the effects of changes in the 
government provision and income distribution on private provision and social sentiments in 
the short-run and in the long run. 
A few authors discussed how social sentiments or cooperation develop in communities. 
Axelrod (1981) demonstrates that cooperation can emerge in a community of egoists playing 
a prisoner dilemma game as long as there is a high probability of future interaction amongst 
players. However, it is difficult to apply Axelrod's analysis to public good games where, 
unlike prisoner dilemma games, there is no clear mean to determine when a player cooperates 
and when she defects since contributions are usually continuous, not binary. Additionally, it is 
impossible to punish (or award) a player in public goods games without punishing (or 
awarding) all other players.  
Van Dijk and Van Winden (1997) theorize that consumers weight the utility of other 
consumers by some factor that they call social ties and that these ties evolve over time 
according to an impulse function. They assume that a consumer’s social tie with another 
consumer is more likely to increase if the other consumer contributes more to the group 
exchange. We use a similar framework to Van Dijk and Van Winden (1997). Our paper 
differs from the Van Dijk and Van Winden’s analysis in two important ways. First, we   4
assume that consumers derive utility directly from the act of contributing rather than from the 
utility of other consumers with whom they have social ties. This assumption better explain 
why some individuals give money to homeless people who they do not know or why they 
contribute to charity organizations even when they do not know who will benefit from their 
contribution. We therefore use a utility function with impure altruism such as the one 
developed by Andreoni (1989, 1990). Second, we assume that an increase in the total 
provision of public goods increases the consumers’ social sentiments.  
Public goods can strengthen social sentiments by facilitating interaction between 
members of the community and by increasing community pride. For example, an education 
system and a justice system can facilitate interaction between members of a community and 
help them resolve their conflicts. Isaac, McCue and Plott (1985), Isaac and Walker (1988) and 
others show that allowing participants in public good experiments to interact increases their 
contributions. These experiments suggest that consumers’ social sentiments generally increase 
when they interact.
1 Parks, museums and cleaner streets can all increase community pride and 
thus strengthen the social sentiments of the community’s members. Schram and Sonnemans 
(1996) find that group identity increases voting participation in a controlled environment. 
Kramer and Brewer (1984) and Brewer and Kramer (1986) also find that individual show more 
restraint in the consumption of a common good when they are identified as part of a group. 
We show that if consumers are impurely altruistic and their social sentiments increase 
with increases in the total provision of the public good, the community will converge to an 
equilibrium level of social sentiments with higher private provision than predicted by 
traditional theory. Our paper has several important implications for government policy. First, 
although government provision of the public goods will partially crowds out private provision 
in the short-run, it may cause a net increase in private provision in the long run by 
strengthening the social sentiments of the community’s members. Second, governments can 
increase the total provision of the public good, and move the community to an equilibrium 
with higher social sentiments, by shifting income from a more impurely altruistic to a less 
impurely altruistic consumer. Finally, an increase in government provision will cause a larger 
increase in the total provision of the public good and a larger increase in consumers’ social 
sentiments in the long run if the government levies a higher tax on more impurely altruistic 
consumers. 
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2.   The Static Model 
 
Consider a community of n consumers. A community in this paper is defined as a group of 
consumers that consume the same public goods. For simplicity, assume that there is only one 
public good and one private good in the economy. Each consumer i, i = 1, …, n, contributes 
si, si ‡ 0, to the provision of the public good. Private provision, S, equals the sum of the 
consumers’ contributions. 
 






The community’s government can allocate resources to the provision of the public good by 
taxing each consumer i a lump sum tax of ti, ti ‡ 0. Assume that the government must 
maintain a balanced budget and does not incur any transaction costs. Under these assumptions 
government provision, G, must equal the sum of the taxes levied on the n consumers in the 
community. 
 






For convenience define consumer i’s allocation, yi, as the sum of her voluntary contribution 
and her involuntary contribution (the tax levied on her). yi = si + ti. Total provision of the 
public good, Y, equals the sum of the consumers’ allocations. 
 







i be consumer i's utility, i = 1,…, n. Assume that consumer i’s utility is a function of her 
consumption of the private good, ci, her consumption of the public good, Y, her contribution, 
si, and her social sentiment, ai.  
A consumer’s social sentiment can be thought of as an index that measures the consumer’s 
affinity towards her community and its members. The higher a consumer’s social sentiment is   6
the more she likes her community. Social sentiments are exogenous from the consumers’ 
perspective but may change from one period to the next as discussed in section 3. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
(4)  U
i = U
i(ci, si, Y; ai)    i = 1, …, n 
 
Assume U
i is twice continuously differential and strictly increasing in its arguments 
(assumption i). Additionally, assume that U








3 be the derivatives of U
i with respect to its first argument, second 






1 > 0, U
i
2 > 0, U
i
3 > 0    i = 1, …, n 
(ii) U
i
 is quasiconcave with respect to ci, si and Y 
 
The quasiconcavity of the utility function is both necessary and sufficient to assure that the 
private good, the public good and the consumer’s contribution are normal goods. Thus an 
increase in the consumer’s wealth will lead the consumer to increase both her consumption of 
the private good and her contribution. 
The second argument in the utility function is what Andreoni terms "impure altruism". It 
represents the utility that consumers derive from contributing resources to the provision of the 
public good. Andreoni argues that consumers are impurely altruistic because they derive a 
feeling of warm glow from contributing. Steinberg (1987) and Harbaugh (1998) note that 
consumers may also receive secondary benefits from contributing that are positively related to 
the size of their contribution such as status and awards of recognition.  
We shall assume that an increase in a consumer’s social sentiment increases her marginal 
utility from contributing (assumption iii). Consumers who have higher social sentiments may 
receive more utility from contributing because they care about other consumers’ utility more 
deeply, because they have a stronger desire to help their community, or because they care 




2/¶ai > 0    i = 1, …, n     
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The consumer’s expenditure on the private good plus her contribution cannot exceed her 
disposable income. A consumer's disposable income equals her endowment, wi, minus the 
lump-sum tax that the government levies on her, ti.  
For simplicity, assume that the community is too small compared to the entire economy to 
influence prices and can convert the private good into the public good at a fixed marginal rate 
of transformation of 1. Each consumer i maximizes her utility subject to her budget constraint. 
 
(5)  Max ci, si U(ci, si , Y; ai)  s.t. ci + si = wi - ti     i = 1, …, n 
 
The budget constraint of consumer i can be rewritten as ci + yi = wi. Let Y-i be the total 
allocation of the public good not including consumer i’s allocation. Y-i = Y - yi. We can 
rewrite the consumers’ maximization problem by substituting the budget constraint into utility 
function and Y - Y-i for yi. 
   
(6)  Max Y U(wi + Y-i - Y, Y - Y-i - ti, Y; ai)  s.t. yi ‡ ti    i = 1, …, n 
 
Assuming an interior solution the first order conditions are:
 3 
 






3 = 0     i = 1, …, n 
 
Following Andreoni (1989), we can write the total allocation of the public good that consumer 
i would choose as a function of the exogenous parameters in the model from the perspective 
of consumer i. 
 
(8)  Y = f
i(wi +Y-i, Y-i + ti, ai)     i = 1, …, n 
 
Next, we obtain consumer i’s desired allocation by subtracting Y-i from both sides. 
(9)  yi   =  f
i(wi +Y-i, Y-i + ti, ai) - Y-i     i = 1, … , n 
 
f






3 be the derivatives of f
i with respect to 
its first argument, second argument and third argument respectively. The second argument 
comes from the impurely altruistic component of the utility function and is non-negative for   8
an impurely altruistic consumer. Andreoni (1989, pp. 1450-52) shows that given the 
assumption of quasiconcavity (assumption ii) 0 < f
i
1 < 1, 0 < f
i




2 £ 1 for an 
impurely altruistic consumer. Andreoni calls a person who does not derive any utility from 






3 is also strictly positive. From (9) we know that the derivative of y
i with respect to ai is 
f
i
3dai. Therefore, if an increase in ai causes consumer i to increase her allocation than f
i
3 must 






3 = 0. If a1 increases by some amount e to a1’, where a1' 
= a1 + e, then by assumption iii U2(ci, si, Y; a1') > U2(ci, si, Y; ai). After the increase in a1, 
U2(c1, s1, Y; a1’) +  U3(c1, s1, Y; a1’) > U1(c1, s1, Y; a1’). If consumer i contributes n 
additional resources then the net change in her utility would approximately be nU2 + nU3 - 
nU1 = n[U2 + U3 - U1] > 0.Therefore, consumer i will increase her allocation if her social 
sentiment increases because by doing so she will increase her utility.  
By totally differentiating (9) we find that in Nash equilibrium dyi/dwi = f
i
1 > 0, dyi/dti = 
f
i
2 > 0 and yi/dai = f
i
3 > 0 for i = 1, …, n. We conclude that an increase in consumer i’s 
endowment, tax or social sentiment will cause her to increase her equilibrium allocation. 
Proposition I draws conclusions about the change in the total provision of the public good that 
will result from changes in the exogenous parameters of the model. 
 
Proposition I: Let Y(w, t t, a a) be the total provision that the community will reach in Nash 
equilibrium given the exogenous parameters of the model. w, t t, a a are vectors of endowments, 
taxes and social sentiments respectively. w = [w1, …, wn], t t = [t1, …, tn] and a a = [a1, …, an]. 
Given assumptions i through iii:
5 
 
(I-a) Total provision of the public good will increase by less than a dollar when the 
endowment of consumer i, i = 1, …, n, increases by a dollar. 
(10)   0 < ¶Y(w, t t, a a)/¶wi < 1    i = 1, …, n 
 
(II-b) Total provision of the public good will increase by a dollar or less when the tax levied 
on consumer i, i = 1, …, n, increases by a dollar. 
(11)   0 < ¶Y(w, t t, a a)/¶ti £ 1     i = 1, …, n 
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(I-c) Total provision will increase when the social sentiment of consumer i, i = 1, …, n, 
increases. 
(12)   0 < ¶Y(w, t t, a a)/¶ai     i = 1, …, n 
 
Proof: Without loss of generality suppose consumer i’s endowment increases by some 
amount dwi but the endowments of all other consumer remain the same, dwj = 0 for all j, j „ i.  
Totally differentiating (9) and substituting dY - dyi for Y-i and dY - dyj for Y-j. 
  














2)]dwi      i = 1, …, n 








2)]dY     j = 1, …, n; j „ i 
 
We solve for the general equilibrium by summing (13) and the n - 1 equations in (14) 
 


















2)]dwi      i = 1, …, n 
 
Rearranging we find out that: 
 
(16)  ¶Y/¶wi = cgi     i = 1, …, n     

























2 £ 1 and 0 < f
i
1 < 1 then 0 < c £ 1 and 0 < gi < 1.Hence, 0 < ¶Y/¶wi < 1. 
Without loss of generality suppose the tax on consumer i is increased by some amount dti 
but the taxes levied on all other consumers remain the same, dtj = 0 for all j, j „ i. Andreoni 
(1989, pp. 1452-53) demonstrates that the net change in total provision of the public good that 
results from the increase in ti is:  
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Finally, without loss of generality, suppose that ai change by some amount dai, but the social 
sentiments of all other consumers remain constant, daj = 0 for all j, j „ i. Totally 
differentiating (9) and substituting dY - dyi for dY-i and dY - dyj for Y-j. 
 














2)]dai      i = 1, …, n 








2)]dY    j = 1, …, n, j „ i 
 
Combining (18) with n - 1 equation in (19) and rearranging: 










3 > 0 then hi > 0. Therefore, ¶Y/¶ai > 0.    ￿  
 
Part b of proposition I is of particular importance because it shows that when consumers are 
impurely altruistic than government provision only partially crowds out private provision. The 
existence of impure altruism helps explain why empirical studies and laboratory experiments 
conclude that crowding out is incomplete.    
  We can now make conclusions about how changes in the exogenous variables affect the 
welfare of a given consumer i. Define y
i(w, t t, a a), i = 1, …, n, as the equilibrium allocation of 
consumer i. As we previously shown y
i(w, t t, a a) increases in wi, ti and ai. An increase in wj, tj 
or aj, j = 1, …n, j „ i will increase y
j(w, t t, a a) and therefore decrease (or not change) y
i(w, t t, 
a a). To see why differentiate (9) with respect to Y-k for some consumer k, k = 1, …, n, k „ j, 




2 - 1 £ 0. Therefore, any change in an exogenous variable that 
will cause consumer j to increase his allocation will cause all other consumers, including 
consumer i, to decrease (or not change) their allocations. We can now draw conclusions about 
how changes in the exogenous parameters affect the welfare of the consumers. 
 
Proposition II: Let V
i(w, t t, a a) be the indirect utility function of consumer i, defined as the 
utility that consumer i receives when all the consumers select their equilibrium allocations 
given (w, t t, a a). V
i(w, t t, a a) =  U
i(wi - y
i(w, t t, a a), y
i(w, t t, a a) - ti, Y(w, t t, a a)). Let ¶Vi/¶a 
denote the change in consumer i’s indirect utility due to a change in parameter a, a = [w1, …, 
wn, t1, …, tn, a1, …, an]. Given assumptions i through iii: 
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(II-a)  An increase in consumer i’s endowment will increase her welfare and the welfare of all 
the consumers in the community. 
(21)  ¶V
j/¶wi > 0      i = 1, …, n; j = 1, …, n 
 
(II-b) An increase in the tax levied on consumer i will decrease consumer i’s welfare but will 
increase the welfare of all the other consumers in the community. 
(22)  ¶V
i/¶ti < 0      i = 1, …, n 
(23)  ¶V
j/¶ti > 0      i = 1, …, n; j = 1, …, n, j „ i    
 
(II-c) An increase in consumer i’s social sentiment will increase the welfare of all the other 
consumers in the community.  
(24)  ¶V
j/ai > 0     i = 1, …, n; j = 1, …, n, j „ i 
 
Proof: From Proposition I an increase in consumer i’s endowment will lead to an increase in 
the total provision of the public good. By our assumption of normality, consumer i will 
increase her contribution and her consumption of the private good. Since all three arguments 
of the utility function would increase as a result of the increase in the consumer’s endowment 






3 = 0. Taking the 
derivative of V
i with respect to ti we find that ¶V






















3 = 0. Therefore, ¶V









j/dti < 0.  




























k/dwi must be 
positive because dy
j/dwi < 0 but dY/dwi > 0 from proposition I. An increase in consumer i’s 


























































j/dti < 0 and dy
j/dai < 0 but ¶Y/¶ti > 0 and ¶Y/¶ai > 0 from 
Proposition I .   ￿   12
An increase in the tax levied on the consumer will tighten her budget constraint and leave her 
worse off while making all other consumers better off. All the other consumers will benefit 
when consumer i increases her allocation as this will allow them not only to increase their 
consumption of the public good but to also increase their consumption of the private good by 
reducing their contribution. 
Suppose that the government increases its provision by levying a tax of ti on every 
consumer i, dti ‡ 0 instead of only on one consumer. From (22) we know that the tax levied 
on consumer i will decrease her welfare because it will decrease her disposable income. 
However, from (23) we know that the tax levied on all other consumers will increase 
consumer i’s welfare because it will lead other consumers to increase their allocations.  










j/dti < 0 while the tax levied on any other j consumer will increase consumer 








i/¶G(t t) represent the change in consumer i’s indirect 
utility caused by a government provision that is financed by a vector taxes t t, t t = [t1, …, tn]. 
  
(25)  ¶V
i/¶G(t t)  = - U
i













dyk/dtj]     i = 1, …, n; j = 1, …, n; j „ i   
 
From (25) we learn that the effect of an increase in government provision on the welfare of 
individual consumers is ambiguous. We can also deduce that regardless of whether the net 
effect on consumer i’s welfare is positive or negative it will be smaller the higher consumer 
i’s marginal utility from contributing is. Consumers who have strong social sentiments and 
therefore high marginal utility from contributing have a strong preference for voluntary 
contribution over involuntary contribution.    
From II-c we know that an increase in one of the consumer’s social sentiment will lead to 
a welfare increase for all other consumers. That is because the consumer whose social 
sentiment increases will increase her contribution. Unfortunately we cannot make any 
conclusions about how changes in a consumer’s social sentiment would affect her own 
welfare. A change in consumer i’s social sentiment will cause a shift in her preferences. 
Therefore, we cannot compare consumer i’s utility before and after the change in her social 
sentiment. 
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3.   The Dynamic Model 
  
In the previous section we discussed the effects of changes in consumers’ social sentiments on 
the total provision of the public good and on consumers’ welfare. In this section we shall 
theorize how social sentiments evolve over time. In particular we shall assume that the social 
sentiment of each consumer change from one period to the next according to an impulse 
function. We shall show that given some basic assumptions about consumers’ impulse 
functions there exist at least one equilibrium level of social sentiments that the community 
will converge to.  
In the proceeding sections we shall assume that the community consists of only two 
consumers, consumer 1 and consumer 2, or, equivalently, that the community consists of two 
groups of identical consumers.
6 Let H
i be the impulse function of consumer i, i = 1, 2. 
Assume that H
i is a function of the total provision of the public good and the consumer’s 
social sentiment.  
 
(26)  dai/dt = H
i( Y(w, t t, a a), ai)     i = 1, 2 
 
We shall make the following assumptions about the consumers’ impulse functions. First, we 
shall assume that the impulse function of each consumer is strictly increasing in total 
provision of the public good (assumption iv). Increases or improvements in public goods 
(such as more schools, more parks, and a better justice system) tend to increase community 
pride and facilitate interaction amongst members of the community.
7 Let H
i
k be the derivative 
of the impulse function with respect to its k




1 > 0    i = 1, 2 
 
Additionally, assume that the impulse function is decreasing in the consumer's social 
sentiment (assumption v). Therefore, if consumer i’s social sentiment increases but the total 
provision of the public good remains constant then the change in consumer i’s social 
sentiment would decrease. Without assumption v the dynamic model would be unstable 
because for some high levels of Y ai, i = 1, 2, will continue to increase indefinitely and for 
some low levels of Y ai will continue to decrease indefinitely.
8    14
(v) H
i
2 < 0     i = 1, 2 
 
Consumers are assumed to be myopic
9, which means that they do not consider how social 
sentiments will change in future periods when they decide how to allocate their resources in a 
given period. Assuming that consumers are myopic is reasonable because people do not 
generally consider how a given action in the present will change their attitudes or emotions in 
the future.  
Next, we find the combinations of a1 and a2 that will keep a1 growing at a constant rate x, 
[H
1 = x] locus, and the combinations of a1 and a2 that will keep a2 growing at a constant rate 
x, [H
2 = x] locus. Let da2/da1^ H
1 = x be the slope of the [H
1 = x] locus and da2/da1^ H
2 = x 
be the slope of the [H
2 = x] locus in (a1, a2) space. We can find da2/da1^ H
1 = x and 
da2/da1^ H
2 = x by setting the impulse functions equal to x and applying the implicit function 
theorem. Define c




2, i = 1, 2. ci > 0 since H
i
1 > 0, by assumption iv, and H
i
2 < 0, by 
assumption v.  
 
(27)  da2/da1^ H
1 = x =  (c
1 - ¶Y/¶a1 ) /¶Y/¶a2   
(28)  da2/da1^ H
2 = x = ¶Y/¶a1 / (c
2 - ¶Y/¶a2)  
 
Of a particular interest are the combinations of a1 and a2 that will keep a1 constant, [H
1 = 0] 
locus, and the combinations of a1 and a2 that will keep a2 constant, [H
2 = 0] locus. Lemma 1 
and Lemma 2 characterize the shape of the [H
1 = 0] and [H
2 = 0] loci. 
 
Lemma 1: Given assumptions i through v: 
(L1-a) As the social sentiment of consumer i, i = 1, 2, approaches infinity or negative infinity 
the marginal change in total provision of the public good due to a unit change in consumer i’s 
social sentiment approaches zero. 
(29)  lim ai￿ ¥ ¶Y/¶ai = 0     i = 1, 2 
(30)  lim ai￿ - ¥ ¶Y/¶ai = 0     i = 1, 2  
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(L1-b) As the social sentiment of consumer i, i = 1, 2, approaches infinity or negative infinity 
the marginal change in the total provision of the public good due to a unit change in consumer 
j’s social sentiment, j = 1, 2, j „ i, approaches zero. 
(31)  lim ai￿ ¥ ¶Y/¶aj = 0    i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2; j „ i 
(32)  lim ai￿ - ¥ ¶Y/¶aj = 0     i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2; j „ i 
 
Proof: Define W as the total endowment. With two consumers, W = w1 + w2. Y cannot be 
smaller than 0 or larger than W, 0 £ Y £ W. From Proposition I, ¶Y/¶ai ‡ 0 at all levels of ai. 
Therefore, there must exist some Y*, Y* £ W, such that:  
(33)  lim ai ￿ ¥ Y(w, t t, ai, aj)  = Y*     i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2; j „ i 
 
If not, then for Y(w, t t, ai, aj) = W there will exist some ai', ai' > ai, such that Y(w, t t, ai’, aj)  
> Y(w, t t, ai, aj), which cannot be true since that implies that Y(w, t t, ai’ aj) > W. ¶Y/¶ai and 
¶Y/¶aj must approach zero as ai approaches infinity. Otherwise, Y > Y* for some sufficiently 
high ai or aj.  
(34)  lim ai ￿ ¥ ¶Y/¶ai = 0     i = 1, 2 
(35)  lim ai ￿ ¥ ¶Y/¶aj = 0     i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2; j „ i 
 
There must also exist some Y`, Y` ‡ 0, such that: 
(36)  lim ai ￿ - ¥ Y(w, t t ai, aj)  = Y`    i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2; j „ i 
 
If not then for Y(w, t t, ai, aj) = 0 there will exist some ai'',  ai'' < ai, such that Y(w, t t, ai'', aj) 
< Y(w, t t, ai, aj), which cannot be true since that implies that Y(w, t t, ai'', aj) < 0. 
¶Y/¶ai and ¶Y/¶aj must approach zero as ai approaches negative infinity. Otherwise, Y < Y` 
for some sufficiently small ai or aj. 
(37)  lim ai ￿ - ¥ ¶Y/¶ai = 0     i = 1, 2 
(38)  lim ai ￿ - ¥ ¶Y/¶aj = 0     i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2; j „ i       ￿ 
 
Now that we showed what happens to the derivative of total provision with respect to a1 and 
a2 at the limits we can show what happens to the slopes of the [H
1 = 0] and [H
2 = 0] loci as a1 
or a2 approach infinity and negative infinity. We shall make the additional assumptions that 
lim ai ﬁ ¥ c
i and lim ai ﬁ - ¥  c
i is not infinity, assumptions (vi) and (vii).   16
(vi) lim ai ﬁ ¥ c
i < ¥    i = 1, 2 
(vii)  lim ai ﬁ - ¥  c
i < ¥    i = 1, 2 
 
From assumptions (iv) and (v), c
i must be strictly positive. Therefore, given assumptions (vi) 
and (vii), 0 <  lim ai ﬁ ¥  c
i < ¥ and 0 < lim ai ﬁ - ¥  c
i < ¥. 
   
Lemma 2: Given assumptions i through vii:  
(L2-a) The slope of [H
1 = 0] locus approaches infinity as consumer 1’s social sentiment 
approaches infinity or negative infinity in (a1, a2) space.   
(39)  lim a1 ￿ ¥ da2/da1^ H
1 = 0 = ¥    
(40)  lim a1 ￿ - ¥ da2/da1^ H
1 = 0 = ¥    
 
(L2-b) The slope of [H
2 = 0] approaches zero as consumer 2’s social sentiment approaches 
infinity or negative infinity in (a1, a2) space. 
(41)  lim a2 ￿ ¥ da2/da1^ H
2 = 0 = 0    
(42)  lim a2 ￿ - ¥ da2/da1^ H
2 = 0 = 0    
 
Proof: From (27) lim a1 ﬁ ¥  da2/da1^ H
1 = 0 =  (lim a1 ﬁ ¥  c
1 - lim a1 ﬁ ¥  ¶Y/¶a1 ) /lim a1 
ﬁ ¥  ¶Y/¶a2. From Lemma 1, lim a1 ﬁ ¥ ¶Y/¶a1 = a1 ﬁ ¥ ¶Y/¶a2 = 0. Therefore, lim a1 ﬁ ¥ 
da2/da1^ H
1 = 0 = (lim ai ﬁ ¥ c
i - 0)/0 = ¥. Similarly, lim a1 ﬁ - ¥ da2/da1^ H
1 = 0 =        
(lim a1 ﬁ - ¥ c
1 - lim a1 ﬁ - ¥  ¶Y/¶a1 ) /lim a1 ﬁ - ¥  ¶Y/¶a2 = (lim ai ﬁ - ¥ c
i  -  0)/0 = ¥. 
  By the same logic, from (28), lim a2 ￿ ¥ da2/da1^ H
2 = 0 =  0/( lim a2 ﬁ ¥  c
2  - 0) = 0 
and lim a2 ￿ - ¥ da2/da1^ H
2 = 0 = 0/( lim a2 ﬁ - ¥  c
2  - 0) = 0.   ￿ 
 
We are finally ready to characterize the equilibria of the community. We will only discuss a 
community with a single equilibrium.  A community with multiple equilibria is discussed in 
the Appendix.  
 
Proposition III: Given assumptions i through vii, there exist an equilibrium level of social 
sentiments that the community will converge to.    17
Proof: It follows from Lemma 2 that the [H
1 = 0] and [H
2 = 0] loci must intersect one another at 
least once. From Lemma 2 the slope of the [H
2 = 0] locus must approach zero when a2 
approaches infinity and when a2 approaches negative infinity and the slope of the [H
1 = 0] must 
approach infinity when a1 approaches infinity and negative infinity. Since [H
1 = 0] is vertical 
when a1 approaches infinity or negative infinity and [H
2 = 0] is horizontal when a2 approaches 
infinity or negative infinity they must intersect at least once.  
At any point left of the [H
1 = 0] locus a1 will increase and at any point to the right of the 
[H
1 = 0] locus a1 will decrease over time. Similarly, at any point above the [H
2 = 0] locus a2 
will decrease and at any point below the [H
2 = 0] locus a2 will increase over time. Given the 
dynamics of the model, if the two loci only intersect once the intersection will be a globally 














Figure 1 shows the [H
1 = 0] and [H
2 = 0] loci in (a1, a2) space. If there is only a single 
equilibrium it must be globally stable. (The community will converge to that equilibrium 
regardless of the level of social sentiments it starts with.)  
Thus far we assigned no meaning to the values of a1 and a2. We can better explain how 
communities develop by adding the assumption that when the consumers’ social sentiments are 
zero they do not derive any enjoyment from contributing. Suppose two consumers (or groups 
of identical consumers) who have no social ties with one another decide to form a community 
in order to jointly provide a public good. Suppose that when the community is formed both of 
[H
2
 = 0] 
[H
1
 = 0] 
 a1 
   
a2 
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the consumers’ social sentiments equal zero. As long as private provision is positive in Nash 
equilibrium with zero social sentiments then the community would build towards a new 
equilibrium, such as the one shown in Figure 1, with positive levels of social sentiments.
 10  We 
define a building community as a community in which the social sentiments increase over time 
and, as a result, private provision increases. Since ¶Y/¶ai > 0 from proposition I the 
equilibrium that the community builds to will have a higher private provision than the Nash 
equilibrium with zero social sentiments.  
Changes in endowments and government provision will change the location of the 
equilibrium. If the resulting equilibrium were to the Northeast of the initial equilibrium in (a1, 
a2) space it would have higher levels of social sentiments and, consequently, higher private 
provision. Conversely, if the resulting equilibrium were to the Southwest of the initial 
equilibrium it would have lower levels of social sentiments and lower private provision. 
Hereinafter, when we compare two equilibria we will refer to the equilibrium with higher 
social sentiments as the higher-contributions equilibrium and to the equilibrium with lower 
social sentiments as the lower-contributions equilibrium. 
In order to analyze the effects of changes in endowments and government policy define 
the short-run as the period immediately following a change in government provision or 
endowment and the long run as the period after the community settles on a new equilibrium. 
Suppose that consumer 1’s endowment increases. From proposition I we know that an 
increase in any of the consumers’ endowments will increase the total provision of the public 
good. By assumptions iv and v, higher total provision requires higher levels of social 
sentiments in order to keep social sentiments constant over time. Therefore, the increase in 
consumer 1’s endowment will shift the [H
1 = 0] locus and the [H
2 = 0] locus outwards as 
illustrated in Figure 2.
11 In the long run the community will build towards a higher-





















If consumer i’s endowment increases consumer j, j = 1, 2, j „ i, will decrease his allocation in 
the short-run. However, as the community builds towards a higher-contributions equilibrium 
consumer j’s social sentiment will increase and he will increase his allocation compared to his 
short-run allocation. If the change between consumer j's allocation in the short-run and the 
long run exceeds the decrease in his allocation in the short-run then an increase in consumer 
i’s endowment will cause a net increase in consumer j’s allocation in the long run.   
  On the other hand, if either of the consumers’ endowments decreases total provision of 
the public good will fall. The decrease in Y will cause the [H
1 = 0] and the [H
2 = 0] loci to 
shift inwards. As a result the community will deteriorate towards a lower-contributions 
equilibrium. A community in this paper is said to be deteriorating if the social sentiments of 
the community’s members decrease over time and, as a result, private provision falls.  
From proposition II we know that an increase in either of the consumers’ endowments 
will make both consumers better off in the short-run. Since an increase in either of the 
consumers’ endowments will cause the community to build towards a higher-contributions 
equilibrium it may lead to further increases in consumers’ welfare in the long run. Conversely 
a decrease in either of the consumers’ endowment will make both consumers worse off in the 
short-run and may lead to further decreases in consumers’ welfare in the long run. 
 
 
   
a2 
[H
1 = 0]    [H
1 = 0]’ 
    a1 
Figure 2 
[H
2 = 0]’ 
   
 [H
2 = 0]   20
4.    Government Policy 
     
In section 3 we show that there exist at least one equilibrium level of social sentiments that 
the community converges to in the long run. In this section we discuss how government 
policy affect the total provision of the public good and welfare in a community of impurely 
altruistic agents in the long run. We focus our attention on increases in government provision 
and on income redistribution.  
Warr (1982) and Roberts (1984) demonstrate that when consumers are purely altruistic 
government provision will completely crowd out private provision. Therefore, increases in 
government provision will not change the total provision of the public good unless private 
provision is zero. Warr (1983) also shows that redistributing income amongst consumers will 
not affect the total provision of the public good.  
When consumers are impurely altruistic, as is assumed in this paper, government 
provision only partially crowds out private provision. In this section we will show that under 
certain circumstances, government provision can crowd in, or increase, private provision in 
the long run by strengthening the social sentiments of the community’s members. We will 
also demonstrate that the government can increase the total provision of the public good by 
redistributing income from more impurely altruistic consumers to less impurely altruistic 
consumers. We begin the section by showing that private charity alone will under-provide the 
public good and therefore there may be a justification for government intervention. 
Samuelson (1954) shows that when consumers are purely altruistic private markets 
under-provide public goods. Impurely altruistic consumers will also under-provide public 
goods under voluntary-contributions mechanism. Rearranging the first order conditions of the 




















1 is consumer i’s Marginal Rate of Substitution of his contribution for the 
private good, denoted as MRS
i
s. Recall that the Marginal Rate of Transformation, MRT, is 






s = MRT    i = 1, 2 
   21
In a community with two consumers and no government provision the Pareto optimal level of 
contributions is the level that maximizes U
i, i = 1,2, subject to the constraint U
j, j = 1, 2, j „ i, 
equals some level of utility u.  
 
(44)  Max U
i(w - si, si, si + sj)  
           s.t. U
j(w - sj, sj, si + sj) =  u     i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2; i „ j 
 














3 decrease with increases in si by assumption of quasi-concavity, the level of 
consumer i’s contribution that solves (43) must be smaller than the level that solves (45).  
Therefore, consumer i contributes less than the Pareto optimal amount. She contributes less 
than is Pareto optimal because she does not account for the positive externality that her 
contribution brings to other consumers by increasing the total provision of the public good.  
From Proposition I we know that an increase in government provision will increase the 
total provision of the public good. An increase government provision, financed by a 
proportional tax, will also reduce consumers’ disposable income and will lead them to 
decrease their consumption of the private good. Given our assumption of quasi-concavity 
(assumption ii) if government provision increases U
i
3 must increase and U
i
1 must decrease for 
every i. Therefore, MRS
i
Y will decrease for every consumer. However, since U
i
23 ‡ 0, by 
assumption of quasiconcavity, MRS
i
s may increase, decrease or remain the same as a result of 
the increase in government provision. Thus, even though private charity alone will under-
provide the public good when consumers are impurely altruistic, an increase in government 
provision may not move the community to a Pareto optimal outcome.   
From proposition II we know that an increase in government provision, financed by a 
proportional tax, may increase or decrease the welfare of a given consumer in the short-run. 
However, the effects of changes in government provision on private provision welfare are 
different in the long run and in the short-run. The differences in the effects of government 
provision between the short-run and the long run are summarized in Proposition IV.   
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Proposition IV: Given assumptions i through vii:  
(IV-a) An increase in government provision will increase the total provision of the public 
good in the long run by more than it increases it in the short-run.  
(IV-b) An increase in government provision can cause a net increase in private provision in 
the long run. Thus, government provision can crowd in private provision in the long run. 
 
Proof: From Proposition I we know that an increase in government provision will increase the 
total provision of the public good in the short-run. An increase in total provision will shift the  
[H
1 = 0] locus and the [H
2 = 0] locus outwards as shown in Figure 2. As a result the 
community will move to a new higher-contributions equilibrium with higher private 
provision. Part (IV-b) immediately follows from part (IV-a). An increase in government 
provision will crowd in private provision in the long run if and only if the increase in private 
provision in the long run exceeds the decrease in private provision that occurs in the short-run 
because of crowding out.     ￿ 
 
Therefore, if consumers are impurely altruistic, not only does an increase in government 
provision only partially crowds out private provision in the short-run, but it may actually 
crowd in private provision in the long run. The community’s government must therefore 
consider both the short-run and the long run ramifications of its fiscal policy.  
From (25) we learn that an increase in government provision financed by a vector of taxes 
t t, t t = [t1, …, tn] may increase or decrease the welfare of a given consumer i. Therefore, an 
increase in government provision may not be Pareto improving in the short-run. However, an 
increase in government provision will also increase the social sentiments of the community’s 
members in the long run. From proposition II we know that an increase in one of the 
consumers’ social sentiments will increase the welfare of other consumers. When the social 
sentiments of both consumers increase simultaneously we cannot make any conclusions about 
the welfare of either consumer because changes in the consumers’ social sentiments alters 
their preferences. However, it is possible that an increase in government provision will make 
all the consumers better off in the long run even if it decreases the utility of some of the 
consumers in the short-run.
12 As the community builds towards a higher-contributions 
equilibrium not only does the total provision of the public good increase but consumers also 
derive more enjoyment from contributing.    23
Increasing government provision is one way in which the government can increase the 
total provision of the public good, but it is not the only way. The government can also 
increase private provision by redistributing income from the more impurely altruistic 
consumer to the less impurely altruistic consumer.
13  
Without loss of generality suppose that the government redistributes income between the 
two consumers by taxing consumer 1 a lump-sum amount of dt and reducing consumer 2’s 
tax by dt. We only discuss an income transfer in which the government taxes one consumer 
and provides the other consumer a tax credit. However, decreasing consumer 1’s endowment 
by some amount dw and increasing the other consumer by a lump-sum payment of dw will 
have an identical effect.
14  The net change in the total provision of the public good is: 
 
(46)  ¶Y/dt =  ¶Y/¶t1 - ¶Y/¶t2 
 
Substituting ¶Y/¶ti = cbi from (17) for i = 1, 2, and rearranging: 
  
(47)  ¶Y/¶t = c(b1 - b2)   
 
Since c > 0 and bi > 0 the transfer will cause an increase (decrease) in the total provision of 
the public good if b1 is larger (smaller) than b2. If b1 = b2 the transfer will have no net effect 






2). bi is a 
measure of how impurely altruistic consumer i is. If consumer i derives no enjoyment for 
contributing (f
i
2 = 0) then bi = 0. The more enjoyment the consumer derives from contributing 
(the higher f
i
2) the higher bi is.  
To understand why transferring income to the less impurely altruistic consumer would 
increase private provision suppose that consumer 2 was purely altruistic (b2 = 0) but 
consumer 1 was impurely altruistic (b1 > 0). Since consumer 1 sees government provision and 
her own contribution as imperfect substitutes she will increase her allocation when the 
government increases the tax levied on her. On the other hand, consumer 2 sees government 
provision and his contributing as perfect substitutes. Therefore, when the government reduces 
his tax by some amount he will increase his contribution by the same amount leaving his 
allocation unchanged. Private provision will increase as a result of consumer 1 increasing her 
allocation and consumer 2 not changing his.   24
The government can therefore increase private provision by taxing the more impurely 
altruistic consumer and transferring the money to the less impurely altruistic consumer (using 
a tax credit or a lump-sum payment). From Proposition II an increase in the tax levied on 
consumer i will reduce her utility in the short-run. Nonetheless, shifting income to the less 
impurely altruistic consumer will increase the total provision of the public good and will shift 
the community to a higher-contributions equilibrium in the long run. Although we cannot 
make any direct conclusions about how consumers utility will be affected we can conclude 
that in the long run consumers will enjoy a higher total provision of the public good and will 
derive more utility from contributing. Therefore, it is possible that a redistribution of income 
will leave all the consumers better off in the long run. 
This paper expands our perspective on the role of governments. A community’s 
government should consider both the short-run and the long run ramifications of its fiscal 
policy. Even when an increase in government provision leaves some consumers worse off in 
the short-run, in the long run all the consumers may end up better off as their social 
sentiments improve. Similarly, even though redistributing income between consumers will 
leave some consumers worse off in the short-run, in the long run all the consumers in the 
community may potentially benefit from a transfers of income from the more impurely 
altruistic consumers to the less impurely altruistic consumer.  
An increase in government provision would be more effective if the government levies 
higher taxes on consumers that are more impurely altruistic. Suppose the government chooses 
a vector of taxes t t. From (17) the resulting change in total provision of the public good is: 
 




bidti     i = 1, …, n 
 
Government provision will have a larger effect on the total provision of the public good if it 
sets a higher tax for more impurely altruistic consumers (consumers with higher bs). 
However, from (25), the more impurely altruistic consumer i is (the higher U
i
2) the more she 
would suffer from an increase in the tax levied on her. The community’s government 
therefore faces a dilemma. Levying a higher tax on the more impurely altruistic consumers 
will lead to a larger increase in the total provision of the public good. However, in the short-
run the more impurely altruistic consumers would suffer more from the increase in their tax. 
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5.   Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 
There is substantial evidence that consumers have some sort of social sentiments and 
therefore derive utility from contributing. Although several authors recognized that consumers 
have social sentiments there is little discussion in the literature on how these sentiments 
evolve. We assume that public goods play a role in increasing consumers’ social sentiment. 
Public goods tend to facilitate interaction amongst community members and increase their 
community identity. For instance, a good education system can help members of a community 
develop important social values and become better citizens. A fair and effective justice system 
can help members of the community peacefully resolve their conflicts. A recreational park 
allows consumers to engage group activities that may strengthen their social ties. 
We show that given some basic assumptions about consumers’ preferences, an increase 
in consumers’ endowments, taxes or social sentiments will increase the total provision of the 
public good. We also show that, given the assumptions of the model, there exists at least one 
equilibrium level of social sentiments that the community will converge to. In a two persons 
community, an increase in one of the consumers’ endowments will move the community to a 
higher-contributions equilibrium and may lead the other consumer to increase his contribution 
in the long run. 
If consumers are impurely altruistic an increase in government provision (via lump-sum 
income taxes) will not completely crowd out private provision in the short-run. Thus 
government provision can potentially increase, or crowd in, private provision in the long run 
by increasing the total provision of the public good and strengthening the social sentiments of 
the community’s members. The government can also increase the total provision of the public 
good by taxing the more impurely altruistic consumer and transferring the money to the less 
impurely altruistic consumer. Such a redistribution of income will cause the community to 
build towards a higher-contributions equilibrium and may increase the welfare of all the 
consumers in the long run. Additionally, we show that an increase in government provision 
would lead to a higher increase in the total provision of the public good if the government 
levies higher taxes on more impurely altruistic consumers.  
There are, however, two objections against the government levying a disproportional 
higher tax on more impurely altruistic consumers. First, impurely altruistic consumers will 
suffer more from the tax then purely altruistic consumers. Secondly, if consumers knew that 
the government determined the tax levied on them based on how impurely altruistic they were   26
they would have the incentive to hide their true preferences. In particular, consumers may opt 
to reduce their contributions since it would signal to the government that they do not derive 
much enjoyment from contributing.
15 
The paper expands our view on the role of the government. A government should 
consider both the short-run and the long run effects of its policy on the consumers’ social 
sentiments and welfare. Generally, a government should help the community build by 
strengthening the social sentiments of its members. The community’s government can do so 
by providing public goods that promote positive interaction between members of the 
community and raise community pride.  
In this paper we assume that there is one public good. However, different public goods 
serve different purposes. Public goods can be classified into one or more of three categories 
depending on the purpose that they serve the community. Some public goods such as public 
parks and roads are directly consumed by members of the community. Other public goods 
such as charity and biodiversity are not directly consumed by most of the community’s 
members but consumers may still derive utility from contributing resources to the provision of 
those goods because they have some sentimental value. Other public goods such as a justice 
system help increase consumers’ social sentiments by facilitating interaction between 
consumers and increasing community identity. Logically, many public goods fall under more 
than one of these categories. Future research can offer additional discussion about how these 
different types of public goods affect the community and what is the optimal provision of 
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Appendix: A community with multiple equilibria 
 
Lemma 2 only describes how the [H
1 = 0] and [H
2 = 0] loci behave at the limits (when a1 or a2 
approach infinity and negative infinity) but imposes no restrictions on the characteristics of the loci at 
finite values of a1 and a2.  The  [H
1 = 0] locus can intersect the [H
2 = 0] locus any odd number of 
times. The two loci must intersect an odd number of time since when a1 approaches negative infinity 
[H
1 = 0] locus must be below the [H
2 = 0] locus and when a1 approaches infinity [H
1 = 0] locus must 
be above the [H
2 = 0] locus.  Assertions A1 and A2 characterizes a community with multiple-
equilibria.  
 
If there are multiple equilibria in a given community 
(A1) Any equilibrium (a1*, a2*) where [H
1 = 0] is higher (has a larger value of a2) than [H
2 = 0] at  
some a1',  a1' = a1* + e where e > 0, is globally stable. 
(A2) Any equilibrium (a1**, a2**) where [H
1 = 0] is lower (has a smaller value of a2) than [H
2 = 0] 
for a some a1'' = a1** + e where e > 0, will have saddle stability. 
Assertions (A1) and (A2) follow immediately from the dynamics of the model, which are explained in 
















If there are three equilibria in the community, the equilibrium with the highest level and the 
equilibrium with the lowest level of social sentiments are globally stable. The intermediate equilibrium 
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Figure 3   28
Northeast of the intermediate equilibrium social sentiments continue to increase until the 
community reaches a globally stable, higher-contributions equilibrium. Southeast of the intermediate 
equilibrium social sentiments will continue to decline until the community reaches a new globally 
stable, lower-contributions equilibrium. 
  A temporary increase (decrease) in endowment or government provision will shift the [H
1 = 0] 
locus up (down) and shift the [H
2 = 0] to the right (left). If the community is on an equilibrium with 
saddle stability, a temporary (one time) increase in either of the consumers’ endowments or in 
government provision will cause the community build to a higher-contributions equilibrium. 
Conversely, a temporary decrease in either of the consumers’ endowments or in government provision 
will cause the community to deteriorate towards a lower-contributions equilibrium.  Therefore, if the 
community is on an equilibrium with saddle stability the government can potentially ‘jump start’ the 
community on a dynamic path towards a higher-contributions equilibrium by temporarily increasing 
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1 We cannot observe changes in consumers’ social sentiments directly. However, we can infer that a consumer’s 
social sentiment increases if she increases her contribution when all other exogenous variables remain constant. 
As shown in section 2, an increase in a consumer’s social sentiment will lead her to increase her contribution.  
2 The utility function will be quasiconcave if and only if its bordered Hessian matrix is negative semi-definite.   
3 Andreoni (1989) notes that as long as we assume that lim si ﬁ 0 U
i
2 = ¥ than an impurely altruistic consumer 
will always choose to make a positive contribution. 
4 The term impurely altruistic is not synonymous with selfish nor is the term purely altruistic synonymous with 
selfless. A purely altruistic consumer only derives utility from the consumption (or provision) of public goods 
while an impurely altruistic consumer also derives enjoyment from her contribution to the provision of public 
goods.  
5 Andreoni (1989) shows the effect of changes in the tax levied on consumer i on the total provision of the public 
good. We also show the effects of changes in consumer i’s endowment and social sentiment on the total 
provision of the public good. 
6 Some of the results of the dynamic model also generalize to n identical consumers (consumers with identical 
preferences and an identical endowments). For instance, our conclusions about the effects of changes in 
government provision still hold for n identical consumers as long as the provision is financed by a proportional 
tax. On the other hand, we cannot guarantee the existence of an equilibrium when income is redistributed since 
after the redistribution the consumers will no longer be identical (they will have different disposable incomes). 
7 With one composite public good we can think of an increase in the total provision of the public good as an 
increase in the quantity or an increase in the quality of public goods. 
8 Assumption v implies that if consumer i’s social sentiment increases then the total provision of the public good 
must also be higher to keep consumer i’s social sentiment constant over time. To see why this is the case let  (Y', 
ai') be some combination of Y and ai such that H
i(Y’, ai') = 0. Given assumptions iv and v, in order to maintain 
ai constant over time, that is have H
i(Y, ai) = 0, we must have a higher level of Y for a higher level of ai. 
9 This assumption is also made by Van Dijk and Van Winden (1997). 
10 Both consumers would contribute a positive amount to the provision of the public good even when their social 
sentiments are zero because their utility function is quasi-concave over the total provision of the public good by 
assumption ii. 
11 We can determine the direction of the shift in the [H
1 = 0] locus by establishing how a2 must change when Y 
increases. Since H
1(Y(w, t t, a a), a1) = 0 along the [H
1 = 0] locus, then if Y increases for some reason than a2 
must decrease to in order to keep Y(w, t t, a a) constant. Therefore, an increase in endowment or taxes will shift the 
[H
1 = 0] locus down (or outwards). Similarly, since H
2(Y(w, t t, a a), a2) = 0 along the [H
2 = 0] locus then if Y 
increases a1 must decrease (thus shifting the locus to the left or outwards) to keep Y the same.     
12 We cannot conclude how consumers’ utility is going to change in the long run as a result of changes in 
government policy because the consumers’ preferences change as their social sentiments evolve. However, we 
can conclude that the consumers’ welfare increase if their utility in the long run is higher than before the change 
in government policy regardless of whether they have the old level of social sentiments or the new level of social 
sentiments. In other words, a consumer’s welfare clearly increases if she prefers the new levels of the private 
good, public good and contribution even if her social sentiment does not change. This may be case if the public 
good is under-provided in the short-run since the total provision of the public good will increase in the long run. 
13 This assertion was made, but not proven, by Andreoni (1989).  






2). If we reduce consumer 1’s income by dw and transfer the 

























2))] Simplifying, dY/dw = c(b1 - b2). 
This result is identical to (47). 
15 If the two consumers are identical in all respects except for their marginal utility from contributing, the 
consumer with the higher marginal utility from contributing would choose a higher level of contribution. 